What lies beneath: transparency in online service supply chains by Cobbe, Jennifer et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcyb20
Journal of Cyber Policy
ISSN: 2373-8871 (Print) 2373-8898 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcyb20
What lies beneath: transparency in online service
supply chains
Jennifer Cobbe, Chris Norval & Jatinder Singh
To cite this article: Jennifer Cobbe, Chris Norval & Jatinder Singh (2020) What lies beneath:
transparency in online service supply chains, Journal of Cyber Policy, 5:1, 65-93, DOI:
10.1080/23738871.2020.1745860
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2020.1745860
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 07 Apr 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 257
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
What lies beneath: transparency in online service supply
chains
Jennifer Cobbe *, Chris Norval and Jatinder Singh
Compliant and Accountable Systems Group, Department of Computer Science & Technology (Computer
Laboratory), University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
ABSTRACT
There is a noticeable trend towards the increased centralisation of
Internet-based services. Though much focus is on the dominance
of organisations such as Facebook, Google and Netflix, popular
consumer-facing services, there has been considerably less
discussion regarding the organisations providing the infrastructure
that supports online services. This bears consideration, given that
many online services rely on a range of platforms and services
operated by third-parties.
As such, this paper explores issues of consolidation as regards the
systems supply chains that underpin and drive online services.
Specifically, we note that while there are trends towards the
increased centralisation and dominance in the provision of
supporting technical infrastructure, the nature of these technical
supply chains are relatively hidden. We explore the broader societal
implications of this with regards to power and resilience,
emphasising the lack of means, legal or technical, for uncovering
the nature of the supply chains on which online services rely. Given
society’s ever-growing reliance on data-driven technology, we argue
that more can be done to increase levels of transparency over the
supply arrangements of technical infrastructure. This is a necessary
precursor to determining what interventions, if any, may be
required to deal with issues of consolidation in online infrastructure.
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1. Introduction
There is a noticeable trend towards the increased centralisation of online services (Internet
Society 2019). From a user perspective, the move in the last decade has been away from the
more decentralised Internet of the past to dominance by a few main companies. Much of
the related policy discourse tends to focus on a number of well-known, user-facing organis-
ations featuring a large user-base, such as Google (including YouTube), Facebook (including
Instagram), Amazon, Microsoft, Twitter, Reddit, Netflix and Spotify to name a representative few.
However, less discussed are potential issues of centralisation and consolidation in terms
of the infrastructural software and services that underpin and ultimately drive online ser-
vices. Many applications, websites and other online/Internet-based services (we use
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‘applications’ to encompass all of these) are built upon a range of technologies and ser-
vices provided by others. These infrastructure services often include, for example, cloud
services (storage, compute, [Anything]-as-a-Service), content distribution networks, soft-
ware, processing and support platforms, analytics services, advertising brokers, and so
forth.1 This means that applications are ultimately reliant on a data-driven supply chain
of technologies and providers.
Consolidation at this service infrastructure level warrants greater attention, not least
because these services provide the ‘building-blocks’ that underpin and enable a wide
range of applications. The potential for consolidation at this level towards a small
number of providers raises various issues. For instance, dominant players would have
the power to directly or indirectly influence the nature of the applications that use
them. This influence could be realised not only by way of the functionality provided,
but also through various conditions of use, e.g. contracts, terms of service, and so forth.
Consolidation at this level would also raise questions of resilience, as a change, update,
bug, failure or outage in a supporting technology or service has the potential to impact
all applications that rely on them (see §3.1).
Indeed, consolidation in the technical infrastructure services that underpin applications
would mean that the nature of that infrastructure (and the practices of the organisations
that run them) can have systemic impacts, affecting a wide-range of applications. Such
effects are amplified in an environment of few alternatives. Naturally, the greater the con-
solidation and centralisation of infrastructure services, the more pronounced these issues
would be.
However, the extent to which there is consolidation, and, indeed, the degree of reliance
on third-party services, is currently unclear. There is little in the way of detailed, publicly-
available information on the true extent to which applications use other platforms and
providers. Though it is recognised that Amazon, Google and Microsoft dominate the
cloud services market (Logic Monitor 2017), this represents only a partial picture. In prac-
tice, technology supply chains may be far more complex, a potential system-of-systems.
Applications may rely on third-parties not only for storage and compute, but also for data-
base services, content distribution and management, data brokerage, analytics, logging
and authentication services, interfaces to machine learning models (e.g. for language pro-
cessing and image recognition), and so on (see §4.3.2). Indeed, the fact that a wide range
of these services have been readily available for some time is evidence that they are used
by applications. But in general terms, the detailed technology supply chains that support
applications are largely opaque; it is often unclear on which providers an application relies.
We argue that greater attention should be paid to these service supply chains. This
aligns with the directions of current policy discussions concerning lower-level technical
infrastructure (a prominent example being the use of Huawei technology in 5G networks
(Swinford 2019)). Without a better understanding of the higher-level technical services
supply chains that are the focus of this paper, the extent to which there is consolidation
at this level will remain unclear. And, without a better understanding of the extent to
which there is consolidation in this context, it will remain unclear where the problems
that we identify as arising from consolidation will manifest.
However, a key challenge, as our analysis shows, is that there are currently few means
for uncovering the nature of these technical supply arrangements. As we demonstrate,
current technical and legal mechanisms for uncovering these system supply chains are
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insufficient to provide the kind of insight required to identify consolidation. This hinders
the policy discourse by limiting the ability to determine whether any interventions are
required, and if so, what interventions are appropriate.
In all, this paper considers consolidation in the online supply chains that support,
underpin and drive online applications. We explore the challenges that consolidation
raises and argue the resulting need for increased transparency over these supply chains
in order to enable appropriate policy responses. Our analysis begins with a brief overview
of run-time supply chains (§2), highlighting their complexity and opacity. In §3 we explore
how consolidation at this service infrastructure level could lead to substantive societal con-
siderations regarding power and resilience, emphasising that these concerns are particu-
larly relevant as we become ever-increasingly reliant on online and data-driven services.
We then (§4 and §5) undertake an analysis considering some technical and legal (data pro-
tection) means for exposing service supply chains. This analysis indicates a degree of con-
solidation within application supply chains, and also highlights the limitations of current
approaches for exploring consolidation. We conclude with a discussion of potential
ways forward in tackling the lack of visibility in infrastructure supply chains, to enable a
better informed policy discourse.
2. Run-time supply chains
Applications are comprised of a range of technologies. They are designed and developed
using various software, libraries, languages and development frameworks (often termed a
‘technical stack’), and execute in particular operating environments (operating systems/
platforms), on particular hardware (CPU architectures, mobile devices, etc.), and leverage
communication infrastructure, often the Internet (e.g. see Charland and Leroux 2011;
Jazayeri 2007). In recent years, online services have increasingly formed part of the tech-
nology mix that underpin and drive applications. These services, which operate at run-
time, support application functionality, delivery and deployment. That is, they provide
some technical functionality that supports applications ‘as a service’. ‘Cloud’ is a collective
term often used to encapsulate many such service offerings. Traditionally, cloud is dis-
cussed in terms of three service models:
. Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), where the service provider effectively provides the
‘servers’ for which tenants (cloud users, i.e. application operators) deploy and
manage their own platforms and applications;
. Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) where tenants use (aspects of) the provider’s stack to
manage their own applications; and
. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) where the service provider offers the tenant the application
itself.
This categorisation (in which the boundaries can blur) focuses on the degree to which a
provider is involved in supporting a tenant’s application and the role in which they play
in doing so (Millard 2020). In this way, cloud services are understood from the perspective
of a tenant, who has a direct relationship and directly interacts with the service provider.
The term [Anything]-as-Service (XaaS) is sometimes used to reflect the fact that there are
a vast range of services available that support applications (Duan et al. 2015). Some
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indicative examples, beyond that of more traditional application storage and compute,
include services for: content distribution; identity, authentication and credential manage-
ment; distributed compute; database management; analytics; logging; machine learning
(both model building and using pre-built models, such as for image recognition); and
even to assist the integration of emerging technologies such as Blockchain and
quantum computing. Applications will use and rely on these services to provide various
functionality at run-time (during operation).
As such, applications will have an underpinning service supply chain, of which data
(exchange) is the driver. A common example indicating the composite nature of appli-
cations is Dropbox, which for a period relied on Amazon cloud for storage (Millard
2020; Miller 2017). In practice, however, the supply chain underpinning an application
can be far more complex, as the number and range of available so-called ‘XaaS’
offerings indicate. Even a fairly basic application may make use of an external single
sign-on service for managing user logins, a customer relationship management (CRM)
system, a service for managing application deployment and scalability to give perform-
ance guarantees, logging services to help manage security concerns, and so forth.
Of course, many goods and services in the physical world also rely on supply chains,
which may themselves be complex, opaque and consolidated. However, supply chains
for online applications are somewhat different as they are driven by data flows. As a
result, they are more intangible and thus potentially more invisible. Moreover, the
nature of data flows in online services and of the online economy more generally
means that they are potentially more dynamic and more rapidly formed than real world
supply chains. Ultimately, however, comparisons with offline services are somewhat
beside the point – regardless of whether real world supply chains are complex, opaque
and consolidated, the complexity, opacity, and consolidation of online supply chains are
in and of themselves potential problems worthy of attention, as we indicate.
2.1. Complexity
Many applications will have a complex supply chain, representing a system-of-systems. Note
that this complexity is not only in terms of technical integration, but also regarding the
range of organisations who provide and operate the supporting services on which appli-
cations rely. This raises further complications, given that each service provider may also
rely on the services of others, representing chains of providers and sub-providers —
which can entail complex relationships (Millard 2020).
This complexity makes mapping such supply chains challenging. As discussed, these
supply chains are data-driven: it is the flow of data between services that drives function-
ality. But in practice, it can be difficult, at both technical and organisational levels, to
discern what and how that data is actually used, processed and transferred once it
moves to another administrative domain (Singh et al. 2015).
The complexity of the systems-of-systems that underpin online applications could lead to
emergent properties and behaviours that cannot be easily predicted or readily understood
(Singh et al. 2018). Essentially, emergence describes a situation whereby a complex system
madeupof individual component parts leads toproperties or behaviours that are not realised
by those individual components when operating independently. Emergence as a general
phenomenon in complex systems has been observed and described (Mogul 2006).
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As a result, systems can become unpredictable and unstable, leading to problems that
are difficult to diagnose or correct. Even where the properties or behaviours that emerge
are considered to be beneficial or desirous, or simply not worthy of concern, the mere fact
of not knowing precisely why they have developed is a problem when it comes to impor-
tant services or critical infrastructure. Emergence can make complex systems difficult to
understand, and it is plainly undesirable to not know why and how these kinds of
systems are functioning.
2.2. Lack of transparency
The lack of transparency in service supply chains is in large part a function of the complex-
ity of these interconnected system-of-systems. As discussed, complexity makes technical
explanations of data flows difficult, not least given the limited ability to ‘see’what happens
to data as it moves beyond a technical or administrative boundary. This opacity does not
just extend to researchers studying the Internet from the outside; the developers and
operators of those services themselves and of other applications that rely on them will
also struggle to understand precisely what is going on, as will regulators and policymakers.
Yet transparency over service supply chains can benefit a range of parties: application
and service providers have an interest in better understanding the systems and entities
that they’re dealing with; users have an interest in knowing what’s happening in the ser-
vices that affect them; researchers have an interest in informing debate; and regulators
and policymakers have an interest in assessing the risks and societally relevant issues of
consolidation.
In any case, there are generally few incentives for companies to provide information
about how and by whom services are being used, nor are there strong incentives for appli-
cation developers to publicise the infrastructure services on which they rely. Indeed, there
may be strong disincentives; for instance, commercial considerations (e.g. not wishing to
discourage potential users or provide insights useful for competitors) and contractual pro-
visions might preclude making such information available.
The challenges of emergence, discussed above, are amplified also by the lack of trans-
parency over service supply chains. This could make it difficult to identify both the exist-
ence and the source of problematic or emergent properties or behaviours, and to assess
the impact they may have. Without greater knowledge of the interconnections of infra-
structure services, the capacity to respond to problems is limited. While it is likely imposs-
ible to eliminate emergent behaviour from such complex systems, transparency would
potentially allow for more proactive oversight, seeking to ensure that the problems
caused by emergence are addressed and can be investigated as far as possible (Singh
et al. 2018).
3. Consolidation considerations and implications
As §2 describes, applications are often built on supply chains involving the services of
others. These supply chains can tend towards consolidation, as application operators
seek to rely on particular expertise, leverage economies of scale, and so forth. However,
as we will discuss in §4 and §5, it can be difficult to get a clear picture of the level of con-
solidation and interconnection in service supply chains. The lack of transparency in supply
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chains may be exacerbated by the fact that, with consolidation, a large number of services
may be operating effectively behind the ‘closed doors’ of a particular company.
Perhaps as a result of this lack of transparency, the service infrastructure that supports
applications has been little discussed (the online advertising industry aside (for example,
Information Commissioner’s Office 2019)). This is despite the fact that consolidation within
these run-time supply chains has important implications, not least as they will underpin a
range of applications on which society has increasingly come to rely. We argue that such
issues therefore warrant consideration by developers, regulators and policymakers alike. In
particular, we highlight two relevant implications of supply chain consolidation relating to
application resilience and to the power of infrastructure providers.
3.1. Resilience
As discussed above, applications and infrastructure services are dependent on others in a
complex, interconnected, and increasingly consolidated system-of-systems. In such a
context, failures by one infrastructural component—whether as a result of emergent beha-
viours or otherwise—can propagate through components located downstream from the
point of failure (Singh, Cobbe, and Norval 2019). This can result in problems affecting the
range of other components that rely on that underlying infrastructure. Indeed, due to the
consolidation of infrastructure services, problems with one infrastructure service can affect
many applications. By contrast, with greater diversity in infrastructure, a failure in one
infrastructure service would potentially have less severe knock-on effects, as fewer appli-
cations would be reliant on that particular service. As a result, applications may be built on
top of consolidated infrastructural supply chains that are fragile in nature.
The complexity and lack of transparency of interconnected infrastructure services
makes it difficult to know where some problems arise. This is because a failure or other
issue may occur at a point far beyond the limits of the visibility available to the designer
or operator of a particular component, service, or application relying on those services. As
well as this, the potential for emergent behaviours and properties, previously discussed,
exacerbates this problem. The lack of transparency and resilience in these interconnected
systems-of-systems not only makes it difficult to mitigate against such failures, but, once a
failure has occurred, may result in it being difficult if not impossible to diagnose the source
of the problem, take corrective action, and restore an application to full functionality.
The failure of the O2 telecommunications network in the UK in December 2018 pro-
vides an example of these cascading consequences. A single expired security certificate
in Ericsson infrastructure ultimately caused a global outage of 3G and 4G Internet services
for O2 customers (BBC News 2018). The same expired certificate also led to a failure of Soft-
bank mobile and fixed-line telephone services in Japan (The Japan Times 2018). Another
example occurred in 2016 when a JavaScript library comprising just 11 lines of code was
removed from a popular package manager, breaking many larger libraries and websites
that directly or indirectly depended on it (Collins 2016).
We can also observe similar issues at higher-level service infrastructures (as is the focus
of this paper). For instance, failures in cloud services do occur (Gunawi et al. 2016); a recent
example involved an outage in Google Cloud that impacted a range of prominent appli-
cations, including Shopify (an e-commerce platform on which many online stores rely), in
addition to Snapchat, Vimeo and Discord (Tung 2019). While the effects of these failures
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were not catastrophic, the potential for severe consequences as a result of such a failure of
critical Internet-based applications is clear.
That said, consolidation could also help improve the resilience of service supply chains.
Where actions are taken to improve resilience, such as software updates, consolidation
means that the resulting effects have impact at scale. Moreover, larger service providers
may have better practices and a better security team than a smaller organisation with
fewer resources. However, this is not necessarily the case; no system is perfect, and failures
are possible in infrastructure suppliers of all sizes (see Gunawi et al. 2016). Moreover, the
larger, better resourced companies do not inherently mean that supply chains are simpler
overall. And even the larger companies may make use of a range of other providers to help
support their infrastructure.
Greater transparency over service supply chains would improve the ability of both
application developers and infrastructure service suppliers themselves to identify develop-
ing problems, locate and investigate the cause(s), and take corrective action to repair or
restore services. Transparency would also assist in developing policy responses to these
issues, which may seek to incentivize the development of mechanisms for improving
the resilience of service supply chains.
3.3. Corporate power and accountability
It has been acknowledged for some time that architecture can constrain, restrict, permit,
and otherwise have a significant influence on behaviour, giving it a regulatory role (Winner
1985). In the online world, as Lessig argues, code in many ways supplants the physical
architecture of the real world as a dominant force influencing behaviour (indeed, Lessig
describes ‘the architecture of the Net, or its “code”’ (Lessig 2006)). Control of the code-
driven infrastructure underpinning online applications gives the corporations involved sig-
nificant regulatory power—that is, the ability to ‘durably affect or constrain the behaviour
of others’ (Delacroix 2019)—which can be expressed in various different ways.
Consolidation of infrastructure services means that a relatively small number of corpor-
ations are in a position to exercise that power with significant influence (Belli and Venturini
2019). This potentially allows those corporations to act as gatekeepers, raising the risk of
such a corporation abusing its position to deny certain actors access to key services. It also
raises the prospect of a corporation with a dominant position in a market artificially raising
the price of a product or service beyond that which would be possible if there was
effective competition. Consolidation among infrastructure services could work to
influence and effectively define the nature of applications, by controlling the functionality
offered and the means by which it is provided.
The provision of infrastructure services is therefore inherently value-laden. This is the
case even when it is apparently done so neutrally, to all customers, without exception.
As has been seen in the recent developments around the website 8chan (The Guardian
2019b), infrastructure providers are increasingly grappling with how to navigate this
tricky terrain. 8chan prioritised user anonymity and the ability to communicate in
largely unmoderated spaces. As a result, it became a forum for neo-Nazism, white supre-
macism, hate crimes and child sexual abuse (The Guardian 2019a). After several violent
incidents were linked to 8chan, including multiple mass shootings, Cloudflare felt that con-
tinuing to provide infrastructure services to the site was unsustainable, and 8chan was
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removed as a customer (Cloudflare 2019). Without Cloudflare’s DDoS protection, 8chan
was unable to reliably remain online.
The ability to offer or deny service to particular websites (even where it may seem to
many people to be a straightforward choice) illustrates that service providers have signifi-
cant power. This is particularly the case where services are heavily consolidated, with rela-
tively few corporations having such a position. However, there are few legal restrictions
and little motivation for infrastructure providers to account for their decisions or for
how they exercise this power.
While the open nature of the Internet mitigates these possibilities to an extent, given
that as others can develop and provide alternatives, the resources required to offer
alternatives at scale, as well as the market power of dominant infrastructure providers, rep-
resent barriers. Greater transparency over service supply chains would give policy-makers
and regulators a more accurate idea of the influence wielded by the corporations involved,
potentially allowing for the development of legal and regulatory responses that seek to
improve the accountability of those corporations.
4. Uncovering supply chains: a technical analysis
Often a range of services comprise an online application’s supply chain. Common
examples of such services include cloud computing, storage, content distribution, e-com-
merce, media, user analytics and advertising, to name but a few. While application devel-
opers/providers will themselves have some knowledge of the application’s underlying
infrastructure services (at least with respect to those with which they directly interact),
many of those underlying services are not user-facing. This means that, at least from a
technical perspective, information about the components and the organisations involved
in supporting an application or service is often not readily available to users or other inter-
ested parties.
In light of the above discussion, we now examine technical approaches in an attempt to
uncover the nature of system supply chains. We outline some methods from the literature,
and conduct our own analysis focusing on the degree to which information about the con-
solidation of online infrastructure services can be obtained. Our findings indicate that
while there does appear some consolidation in (web) application supply chains, shown
by way of identifying a number of prominent and dominant firms, the technical
methods for uncovering system supply chains provide only a limited picture.
4.1. Visibility over data supply chains
When a user interacts with an online application (be it a mobile ‘app’, website, etc.), that
application will typically direct or manage the interactions (data exchanges) with the infra-
structural services on which the application directly relies. In some cases, this will involve
the users—through their device, web browser, etc.—directly interacting with some of the
supporting services that comprise part of the application’s supply chain. For example, in
some cases of content distribution, user authentication or audience analytics, these ser-
vices obtain data directly from, or provide information directly to, users at the instigation
of a particular application. Where there is a direct interaction, i.e. exchange of data,
between the user and a service, it is generally possible to discover (to some degree)
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that the service is involved in the application’s supply chain. This, for instance, by monitor-
ing or logging the communications taking place between the user and that service.
In this way, these services are notionally ‘visible’ from the user’s perspective; one can
see that data flows to and from those services by virtue of directly interacting with
them (see Figure 1). This visibility has been leveraged to explore the use of third-party ser-
vices in supporting a variety of different kinds of application (Binns et al. 2018a, 2018b;
Englehardt and Narayanan 2016; Libert 2015; Starov and Nikiforakis 2017).
However, there are also cases where there is no direct interaction between the user
and other services supporting that application. That is, once user data flows to a
service, the subsequent data flows beyond that point are typically invisible from the
user perspective (and vice-versa regarding the information a user receives). The lack
of a direct interaction between the user and these ‘deeper’ supporting services rep-
resents a key challenge when attempting to technically uncover application supply
chains.
4.2. Measuring user-oriented data flows
As discussed, it is possible to identify some of the third-party services supporting an appli-
cation by recording and analysing the communications being made. In a web context,
these communications are typically through the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
(Mozilla 2019)2, involving request and responsemessages between a user’s device (typically
via a browser or app) and a server.
Since these HTTP messages travel to and from the user’s system, monitoring these
messages represents a means for identifying and measuring the use of certain third-
party services that support online applications. Measuring these communications across
many applications can reveal the prevalence of particular services and providers, and
thereby indicate the level of consolidation within the applications’ supply chains.
Figure 1. An example illustrating the visibility of user interactions with third-parties as they use an
application. This represents the level of visibility for those methods that explore application interactions
with third-party services.
JOURNAL OF CYBER POLICY 73
We now explore some relevant literature that considers the HTTP communications of
applications to identify interactions with third-parties. We then use similar data capture
methods to undertake a more consolidation-oriented analysis regarding the underpin-
nings of popular websites.
4.2.1. Prior work on third-party domain call-outs
Much of the literature on identifying third-parties from HTTP traffic focused on behavioural
tracking and privacy. The work of Libert (2015) and Englehardt and Narayanan (2016), for
example, analysed the HTTP messages with third-parties from across approximately one
million websites. In both studies, the researchers used an automated process to visit
each of the websites, and analysed the third-party domain names3 involved when visiting
each site. By doing so, these papers set out to investigate and identify the key domains
and organisations involved in online tracking and advertising.
Libert found that the majority of websites involved interactions with a third-party
service – 88 per cent of the websites analysed had initiated HTTP requests between the
user and one or more third-party domains (the average site making requests to around
9.5 third-party domains). HTTP requests to Google-owned domains (which include goo-
gle.com, google.co.uk, youtube.com and others) were made by around 78 per cent of
the websites – results which reflect Google’s dominance. Other prevalent organisations
included Facebook (requests to a Facebook-owned domain were made by approximately
32% of websites), Akamai (23%), and Twitter (18%). Englehardt and Narayanan (2016) also
found evidence of Google’s influence, finding that 12 of the top 20 third-party domains to
which requests were being made were Google-operated domains, and that Facebook,
Twitter, Amazon, AdNexus and Oracle were present on more than 10 per cent of sites
analysed.
While both of these studies focused on websites, similar work has also explored and
analysed the HTTP interactions with third-parties in browser extensions4 (Starov and Niki-
forakis 2017) and Android applications (Binns et al. 2018a, 2018b). As with websites, third-
party domains operated by Google were found to be prevalent, as were domains operated
by Amazon and Facebook.
4.3. A focus on consolidation
The results of those studies suggest a degree of consolidation regarding the third-party
organisations associated with applications. However, that work did not focus on exposing
consolidation per se. We therefore conducted a similar analysis to focus on the potential for
such methods to identify consolidation; indicate some types of services comprising appli-
cation supply chains and where consolidation can occur; and the limitations of such
approaches for exploring consolidation in system supply chains.
4.3.1. Interactions with third-party domains
For our analysis, we identified a list of websites to observe by combining the Alexa top 500
rankings5, the Moz top 500 list6, and the top 1,000 from the Majestic Million list7 as of July
2019. This left us with a list of 1,146 unique websites to investigate. We wrote a Python
script to systematically visit each website, and collect information about the HTTP com-
munications taking place.8 Specifically, we captured the URLs for all outgoing HTTP
74 J. COBBE ET AL.
messages (e.g. the Google Analytics JavaScript: https://www.google-analytics.com/
analytics.js), and the HTTP header data (additional information from the communication
protocol) from the interactions with 1,127 websites.9
Generally, our findings are similar to that of the work discussed above. Of our 1,127
websites, the vast majority (89.3%) made requests to other domains (i.e. a different
domain to that of the site being analysed). In total, we observed interactions with a
total of 1,628 distinct third-party domains. Table 1 presents a list of the top 50 most preva-
lent domains that were accessed by the websites. From this we see that Google was pro-
minent: google-analytics topped the list, and services operated by Google (Alphabet)
made up eight of the top 10. Many of the prevalent domains appeared to be advertising
and/or analytics oriented –we observed that many sites used one or more of such services,
which indicates the prevalence of advertising within online ecosystems. However, we also
see some infrastructure services including content distribution and cloud computing
throughout the list.
Note, however, that the data of Table 1 represents an application resulting in a direct,
user-oriented interaction with a particular domain. Importantly, this does not necessarily
mean that these services are there for a particular purpose or operate in a particular
way, and further, that the lack of a direct interaction with a particular domain does not
imply that a particular service is not being used somewhere within the broader system
supply chain. For example, 7.4 per cent of sites were observed making HTTP requests
directly to amazonaws.com, belonging to Amazon Web Services (AWS). As a major
cloud provider, we would expect many more applications to use AWS. However, the 7.4
per cent only reflects the number of applications that resulted in a direct user interaction
with that particular Amazon domain. The numbers from the domain analysis would not
capture, for instance, that a service provider could offer different services through
different domains, and that applications (and third-party services) may be hosted or
manage interactions with AWS services through their own domain. Indeed, on a deeper
analysis, we saw evidence indicating that Amazon AWS was far more involved in appli-
cation supply chains (as discussed below).
4.3.2. Consolidation within different types of third-party services
The supply chain underpinning an application can involve a range of tools and services,
both involved directly (i.e. used by the application itself) or indirectly (used by a service
on which the application depends). Some key categories of these types of services are pre-
sented in Table 2, alongside the typical role they play in supporting an application. We
now consider some of these categories with respect to our data, and discuss evidence
of consolidation which could be observed:
Advertising and Analytics: Advertising and analytics services both involve data collec-
tion about the user’s browsing habits. From Table 1 we see that many different advertising
and analytics services were prevalent, suggesting a number of dominant firms in the
advertising and analytics ecosystem. Specifically, we see that Google dominated this
list, taking eight of the top 10 places. Google Analytics was the most prominent third-
party domain we observed by way of requests, while Google’s DoubleClick platform
was the most frequently occurring advertising domain. Facebook and other advertising
entities also featured prominently. Our findings, consistent with that of other research
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(Englehardt and Narayanan 2016; Libert 2015), indicate some consolidation in the area of
advertising and analytics.
JavaScript Libraries: We observed that requests for JavaScript files were called by over
93 per cent of thewebsites observed,with 85 per cent ofwebsites requesting JavaScript files
from third-party domains. Whilemany of these were related to the advertising and analytics
Table 1. The 50 most frequent interactions with (call-outs to) third-party domains from 1006 web
applications. Note we broadly categorise these sites to provide context; a given domain may serve
several purposes.
Domain Operated by Purpose Prevalence # sites/1006
1 google-analytics.com Google (Alphabet) Analytics 679 (67.5%)
2 doubleclick.net Google (Alphabet) Advertising 669 (66.5%)
3 google.com Google (Alphabet) Search & Other 632 (62.8%)
4 google.co.uk Google (Alphabet) Search & Other 548 (54.5%)
5 googletagmanager.com Google (Alphabet) Analytics 498 (49.5%)
6 googleapis.com Google (Alphabet) Developer tools 429 (42.6%)
7 gstatic.com Google (Alphabet) Offload static content 418 (41.6%)
8 facebook.com Facebook Social Media & Other 382 (38.0%)
9 facebook.net Facebook Social Media & Other 354 (35.2%)
10 googletagservices.com Google (Alphabet) Analytics 250 (24.9%)
11 googlesyndication.com Google (Alphabet) Advertising 224 (22.3%)
12 googleadservices.com Google (Alphabet) Advertising 205 (20.4%)
13 adnxs.com AppNexus (Xandr) Advertising 199 (19.8%)
14 scorecardresearch.com Full Circle Studies (Comscore) Analytics 190 (18.9%)
15 cloudfront.net Amazon Content Distribution 181 (18.0%)
16 twitter.com Twitter Social Media 178 (17.7%)
17 adsrvr.org The Trade Desk Advertising 160 (15.9%)
18 everesttech.net Adobe Advertising 150 (14.9%)
19 rubiconproject.com Rubicon Project Advertising 147 (14.6%)
20 demdex.net Adobe Analytics 143 (14.2%)
21 casalemedia.com Casale Media Advertising 125 (12.4%)
22 amazon-adsystem.com Amazon Advertising 123 (12.2%)
23 openx.net OpenX Advertising 122 (12.1%)
24 ampproject.org Google (Alphabet) Web Development 119 (11.8%)
25 quantserve.com Quantcast Analytics 117 (11.6%)
26 youtube.com Google (Alphabet) Multimedia 114 (11.3%)
27 yahoo.com Yahoo! (Verizon) Search & Other 112 (11.1%)
28 pubmatic.com PubMatic Advertising 107 (10.6%)
29 linkedin.com LinkedIn (Microsoft) Social Media 105 (10.4%)
30 newrelic.com New Relic Analytics 104 (10.3%)
31 nr-data.net New Relic Analytics 104 (10.3%)
32 rlcdn.com RapLeaf (TowerData) Analytics 104 (10.3%)
33 bing.com Microsoft Search & Other 103 (10.2%)
34 mathtag.com MediaMath Advertising 102 (10.1%)
35 bidswitch.net BidSwitch (IPONWEB) Advertising 101 (10.0%)
36 ytimg.com Google (Alphabet) Content Distribution 101 (10.0%)
37 ads-twitter.com Twitter Advertising 98 (9.7%)
38 cloudflare.com Cloudflare Content Distribution 98 (9.7%)
39 criteo.com Criteo Advertising 98 (9.7%)
40 t.co Twitter Social Media 97 (9.6%)
41 consensu.org IAB Europe Cookie Notice 94 (9.3%)
42 adobedtm.com Adobe Analytics 88 (8.7%)
43 criteo.net Criteo Advertising 87 (8.6%)
44 hotjar.com Hotjar Analytics 81 (8.1%)
45 turn.com Amobee Advertising 81 (8.1%)
46 omtrdc.net Adobe Analytics 80 (8.0%)
47 adform.net Adform Advertising 78 (7.8%)
48 moatads.com Moat (Oracle) Analytics 77 (7.7%)
49 advertising.com Advertising.com (Verizon) Advertising 75 (7.5%)
50 amazonaws.com Amazon Cloud Computing 74 (7.4%)
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services above, there were also requests for other types of libraries; e.g. jQuery—a popular
library for simplifying a number of common JavaScript tasks—was requested by 46 per cent
of websites. While many of these sites (60%) requested the jQuery library from a third-party
domain, we also observed that the library came froma range of different sources –with over
100 unique domains serving the jQuery script. In other words, despite the prevalence of this
library, its source was highly distributed. Components ‘distributed’ as such differ from other
supporting services that are more clearly under the direct control or management by a par-
ticular entity, and may raise additional considerations.
Hosting providers: A website may have the technical infrastructure provided by one or
more cloud-based services (virtual machines/servers, file storage, databases, etc.). From an
external viewpoint, it may not always be obvious which organisations are involved in
hosting a website or online resource. This is because the user typically only interacts
with the domain name of the website as opposed to the supporting host(s); e.g. a user
visits netflix.com, despite Netflix making extensive use of Amazon AWS services
(Amazon 2017). As such, we also investigated the headers10 of HTTP interactions in
order to have more information beyond just that of the URL being accessed. We observed
that in some instances the hosting services were reported within the optional parameters
of HTTP headers.
Looking throughout the visible supply chains of each site, we could explore the use of
third-party hosting providers on which a given website relies (i.e. used either by the site
themselves or by a third-party resource on which each site relies). Unsurprisingly,
Google was prevalent, supplying content to 79 per cent of our 1,127 sites. Similarly,
Amazon S3 (storage) could be identified in the supply chains of 53 per cent of our sites,
Microsoft Azure by 29 per cent, and Fastly by 13 per cent.
Again, in terms of consolidation, it appears that the services of a small group of com-
panies support a large number of sites. Even in instances where a particular application
does not itself use a particular web hosting provider, that does not mean the provider
is not involved somewhere in the application’s supply chain. This is because that provider
could be used by other third-party services on which the application relies.
Table 2. A selection of different types of services that can support online applications.
Category Description
Advertising Provides adverts to the users of the web application.
Analytics Records information about the users’ habits when using the web application.
Authentication Allows users to log in to the site using their account details from another service.
Content Delivery Network
(CDN)
A collection of servers which redistribute web content to users according to demand and
geographic location.
Content Management System
(CMS)
An application to create and manage web content.
eCommerce A platform for managing online commerce, sales, etc.
Framework A software framework to assist developers in the creation and deployment of web
applications.
HTTP Server Software which manages the distribution of files on web server hardware.
JavaScript Library A script executed within the user’s browser which can provide more sophisticated
functionality to the web application.
Operating System Software installed on the server which manages its hardware and software.
Payment A platform for managing monetary transactions online.
SSL Certificate Provider A service which provides a digital certificate, authenticating a website and enabling
encrypted communications.
Web Hosting Provider A service which provides infrastructure for hosting web applications.
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Content Delivery Networks (CDNs): Similar to web hosting providers, looking at the
domains being accessed does not itself provide a clear indication of CDNs being used
(again, given that the user will interact with the domain of a website, such as netflix.com,
rather than its underlying infrastructure services). However, we can once again explore the
HTTP headers in order to gain some insight into the use of CDNs. In some cases, CDNs were
named within the server header (e.g. CloudFlare and Akamai), and we also observed
optional (e.g. ‘x-cache: Hit from CloudFront’) or custom headers (e.g. ‘x-akamai-trans-
formed’) being used. By analysing the supply chain of each site, we observed that 54
per cent of our sites relied on content distributed through the CloudFront CDN. Similarly,
CloudFlare and Akamai were present within the supply chains of 30 per cent and 33 per
cent of sites respectively.
HTTP servers and Content Management Systems (CMSs): The server field in a HTTP
response often reported information about the HTTP server software used. We observed
some 60 per cent of web applications reporting the use of one of two servers: NGINX or
Apache, used by 35 per cent and 25 per cent of sites respectively. Regarding CMSs, we
identified the use of WordPress and Drupal by 171 sites (88 sites (8%) and 83 sites (7%)
respectively) by analysing URLs and HTTP headers.
While there appears a degree of consolidation with regards to HTTP servers and CMSs,
note that the examples mentioned represent open source software. Again, this may raise
different policy considerations, given that the technology may not be managed and oper-
ated by an organisation in the same way as they might be, for example, through the use of
a particular cloud service, and because open source can be customised and extended.
4.3.3. Service types in practice: single domain analysis
Looking to how these components and services can come together to support a website,
we now outline an illustrative ‘deep-dive’ into one application: www.thesun.co.uk, a UK-
based news website. We undertook a manual exploration to indicate its composition.11
When visiting www.thesun.co.uk we recorded many HTTP requests to third-party
domains. The third-party HTTP requests included calls to an extensive list of advertising
(including Pubmatic, DoubleClick, and AppNexus) and analytics (such as Google Tag
Manager, Krux Analytics, and RapLeaf) domains. The site also requests a number of Java-
Script files, including the Facebook SDK for social integration, and for https://www.
thesun.co.uk/wp-content/themes/thesun/js/promise.min.js, indicating the use of Word-
Press as the CMS. Inspecting the headers of the responses indicated more information
about the infrastructure, including that the web hosting provider was WordPress VIP,
the HTTP server was NGINX, and we observed the use of Akamai as a CDN.
We also observed different third parties being included while navigating to different
sections of the site. Visiting news stories initialised call-outs to Spot.IM for comments,
and login.thesun.co.uk requested scripts from Auth0 for authentication. The page help.-
thesun.co.uk indicated within response headers that it used SalesForce as a Customer
Relationship Manager (CRM), and requested JavaScript files such as jQuery and Bootstrap.
We also noted that mypreferences.thesun.co.uk used Amazon CloudFront – a different
CDN to that of the homepage.
Generally, the site was dynamic, whereby the use of third-party services depended on
the webpage or subdomain that the user was visiting. This illustrates the potential com-
plexity and multi-party nature of application supply chains, which can involve numerous
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services which may or may not always be observable without deeper investigation. In
terms of consolidation, it highlights some of the challenges faced when attempting to
understand the entities involved when visiting a website or using an application.
4.4. The technical challenges in uncovering consolidation
Our analysis aligns with that of related work, and confirms a general intuition, by finding
that (a) applications entail a complex supply chain, and (b) a small number of corporations
play a significant role in the supporting of popular online applications. While providing
some evidence of consolidation in online infrastructure service supply chains, our
results are only indicative. There are a number of challenges in technically uncovering
the nature of supply chains, as we now explore. We argue that more is needed to
enable a more accurate measurement of consolidation in online services.
4.4.1. Limitations of analysis
We observed several limitations of measuring data flows between users and third-parties
as a means of assessing the consolidation of service supply chains.
HTTP messages are only indicative of technologies used: Much of our analysis involved
identifying the use of technologies through their HTTP messages, either through analysing
the third-party domains (URLs) being requested, or by exploring the header information
within the HTTP responses being returned. While indicative, in both cases these are
insufficient for providing accurate measurements of consolidation. The former approach
means that many infrastructure providers are masked, hidden behind the domains with
which there is a direct interaction. For the latter, we often relied on optional HTTP
headers, which are dependent on the way that site or associated services are built and
configured. As the nature of the headers can vary, their utility as reliable indicators are
limited.12 Further, undertaking the analysis involved a degree of intuition and inference
on behalf of the researchers. As such, these approaches do not provide a reliable way
of exploring consolidation within application supply chains.
Third-parties contacted may vary: Our data was captured by visiting the homepage of
each site once. However, previous work has found that the third-party services called by
a particular website can often fluctuate from visit to visit (Sørensen and Kosta 2019).
The third-parties involved in a supply chain could vary greatly depending on the part of
the website being accessed (as we saw in §4.3.3), the user’s physical location, whether
they are logged in or profiled, and what they are attempting to do on the website, etc.
In other words, the third-party services invoked by a website can be highly contextual,
and automating the analysis of these application interactions will often be limited in
coverage.
Identifying organizations and their role in the supply chain is difficult: While we identified
a large number of third-party domains being contacted, it wasn’t always possible to ident-
ify (i) the organisation behind that domain, nor (ii) the nature of their service in the context
of the particular application.
One challenge is that a given organisation may operate a number of domain names. For
example, Google (Alphabet) operates well-known domains like youtube.com, but also
more technical domains which may be less recognisable, such as 1e100.net (Google
2019b). Particularly for smaller, less well-known organisations, it can be difficult to map
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a domain to the organisation which operates it, which results in opacity. Some in the lit-
erature created annotated lists of organisations and their associated domains (e.g. Libert
2015, 2018), and others used WHOIS records in an attempt to identify organisations (Binns
et al. 2018b).13 We explored both of these options, and while helpful on occasions, neither
were consistent and reliable in identifying the organisations operating a domain in order
to investigate consolidation.
Moreover, even identifying that a given domain is involved in a website’s supply chain
does not necessarily indicate the extent to which it is involved, nor the services being pro-
vided. For example, we observed a large number of call-outs to facebook.net, but given
that Facebook operates a number of services (social media integration, authentication,
developer tools and advertising, etc.), knowing what services are relied upon may not
always be clear.
4.4.2. The technical challenges in uncovering supply-chain transparency
As outlined in §4.1, an inherent limitation of the methods that we have used is that they
can only typically detect third parties with whom the user has a direct interaction, i.e. by
way of a network request. However, there are also infrastructural services that do not inter-
act directly with the user, but instead only with the application (or with other infrastructure
services). Common examples might include storage, databases, and so on. Analysis predi-
cated on measuring communications between users and third parties will not reveal these
services, instead only detecting the direct (‘first-hop’) interaction—i.e. between users and
third-parties—in the supply chain. This means that the other infrastructure providers
remain hidden from view. Aside from the wider issues of consolidation and transparency,
this also has the potential to cause problems to service providers themselves, as we dis-
cussed in §3.1, such as for risk management. Applications may come to rely on third-
party services, libraries, etc. beyond their (and their operator’s) scope of visibility, which
represent points of failure where issues can propagate throughout and across systems.
In short,while there are some technicalmethods that can assist in shedding light on supply
chains, these only appear capable of providing a partial view over the technical supply chain
underpinning an application. Nevertheless, the results of such analyses are indicative of some
consolidation taking place. From a technical perspective, more transparency would assist in
gaining a better understanding of the implications of infrastructure consolidation. Prove-
nance-based approaches to tracking data flows throughout systemsmay indicate one poten-
tial way forward (Singh, Cobbe, and Norval 2019). However, any such solutions need more
than just technology; important are the motivations and incentives for application and
service providers tomake their supply chainsmore transparent in the first place. Legal mech-
anisms may offer some assistance in this regard, which we explore next.
5. Legal mechanisms for investigating infrastructure supply chains
Beyond technical means, some legal mechanisms exist that may provide a degree of infor-
mation about infrastructure supply chains through transparency obligations. In investi-
gating these, we found that these are generally limited in application and utility.
We note that the legal frameworks applying directly to the providers of some types of
infrastructure services—such as the EU’s Networks and Information Systems Directive
(European Union 2016a)—do not typically provide for the kind of transparency that
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would assist in investigating technical supply chains or their consolidation. But other fra-
meworks that provide for transparency in technical systems may be of benefit.
In particular, data protection law appears to be one route for gaining more information
about these supply chains. Data protection law, such as the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) (European Union 2016b), governs the processing14 of personal data
(that is, any information about an identified or identifiable natural person15) and typically
provides for individuals to be adequately informed about what is happening with their
data and with whom it is being shared. Since supply chains often involve a flow of personal
data between applications and services deep into the chain of system-of-systems that
support them, these transparency requirements in data protection law should, in
theory, provide a mechanism for investigating these data flows – not just at a higher
level of the supply chain, but at multiple levels.
However, while personal data is defined broadly in GDPR16, it is possible that much of
what will flow through supply chains between applications and infrastructure services will
not fall within that definition. As GDPR would not apply to that processing, neither would
its transparency mechanisms.
Where infrastructure services do process personal data and therefore come within the
remit of data protection law, GDPR would typically consider infrastructure providers to be
data processors17 who act under the instruction of the providers of applications18 (who are
considered to be data controllers; the entities who determine the means and purposes of
the processing).19 Multiple controllers, processors and subprocessors may be involved in a
given supply chain, and therefore, GDPR’s various transparency mechanisms could poten-
tially provide insight into the data flows between them.
Some of these transparency mechanisms relate to data subjects (the individuals to
whom personal data relates – users in this context), and oblige data controllers to
provide them with certain information where their personal data is obtained or upon
request. Other mechanisms relate to the relationship between data controllers and data
processors, and to obligations to provide information to data protection regulators for
oversight purposes. Some of these transparency mechanisms will be of less utility to con-
siderations of consolidation than others. We now consider these in turn.
5.1. Transparency to data subjects
GDPR provides that data controllers should give certain information to data subjects at
certain points. This includes, among other things, an obligation to inform data subjects
of the recipients or categories of recipients of personal data, if any, and of the purposes
for its processing. Potentially, this could allow data subjects to be informed not only of
which infrastructure providers are receiving their data throughout all levels of the
supply chain, giving them some idea of the data flows involved, but also to have some
insight into which kinds of services those providers are offering. GDPR establishes obli-
gations to provide data subjects with this information upon first obtaining the personal
data20 (in practice, typically through privacy policies), and to provide this information to
data subjects where it is subsequently requested21 (typically through a ‘right of access’
to personal data, exercised through a subject access request).
To investigate consolidation in online services supply chains by obtaining information
about data flows, we analysed the privacy policies of several websites and exercised the
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right of access in relation to a selection of prominent applications. We found that, in prac-
tice, these legal mechanisms were generally insufficient to provide the kind of transpar-
ency necessary to understand the data flows or supply chains underpinning an
application, or consolidation in any detail, as we now discuss.
5.1.1. Privacy policies and transparency requirements
Privacy policies contain information about how the company will treat and disseminate
customer information, which may help consumers decide whether to disclose information
(Metzger 2007). Policies such as these are often required under data protection and
privacy laws, including GDPR. While one might expect that privacy policies would
outline the third parties involved in the delivery of an online application or service,
Libert (2018) studied the policies of approximately 1 million websites looking for the
names of third parties identified through the monitoring of HTTP requests. They found
that only 14.8 per cent of data transfers to identified third parties were disclosed, with
data transfers to Google being disclosed 38.3 per cent of the time, whereas those
‘without consumer-facing services’ were said to have an average rate of disclosure
below 1 per cent. While these HTTP requests likely involved some form of personal data
(such as a user’s IP address), it is worth noting that some third party service providers
within an application’s supply chain may not deal with personal data. In such cases,
there is no obligation under the GDPR for those services to be disclosed in the appli-
cation’s privacy policy.
To gain a wider understanding of the extent in which third parties are disclosed in such
documents, we manually explored the terms of service and privacy policies of 12 popular
websites.22 The websites were selected to represent a broad range of services, selected for
(i) making a large number of third-party requests, as determined from our technical work
in §4; (ii) having a high (global) Alexa web ranking23; (iii) for being UK-based (thus subject
to the GDPR and where policies are written in English) and having a high (UK) Alexa web
ranking (and therefore, given their prominence, likely familiar with the GDPR); or (iv)
having a high Alexa web ranking within a health-related category24 and thus an
example where information can be particularly sensitive.25 These 12 websites are listed
in Table 3.
In most cases, we found that the names of third parties being used were not disclosed
in either the terms of service or privacy policy documents – though often a list of subsidi-
ary organisations (from the main organisation) was provided. Rather, the websites tended
to rely on providing (fairly) vague categories of third parties, such as for advertising, ana-
lytics, social media, and those which ‘provide, manage and improve our websites’.
Information about other third-party organisations providing technical infrastructure
was similarly vague. A representative example includes ‘[data may be shared] with
others (companies, contractors) to provide services relating to technology, data analysis,
research,… ’. Such statements provide little visibility over an application’s technology
stack, nor do they facilitate one in determining the third-parties involved in its supply
chain. That said, on a few occasions, some external organisations were explicitly named
where they related to tracking and advertising; we observed that Google Analytics
appeared to be directly named as a third party on a few sites.
In all, we found that privacy policies as currently used are insufficient, providing
inadequate information about an application’s use of third-party services. As discussed,
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examining privacy policies seem promising in theory since they require information to be
provided about the recipients of personal data and the purposes for its processing. This
seems to provide a mechanism for investigating data flows through the infrastructure
service supply chain. But, in practice, the privacy policies we studied indicate that insuffi-
cient information is provided on personal data flows to determine which infrastructure ser-
vices are used by the applications in question, even at the surface level, let alone deeper
into their supply chains.
5.1.2. Right of access
As discussed, GDPR also provides data subjects with the right to obtain from data control-
lers, among other things, information relating to ‘the recipients or categories of recipient
to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed’.26 To explore whether third-
party services would be disclosed (either by name or by category), we submitted right
of access requests to a selection of prominent online applications. These requests specifi-
cally asked for information about ‘the recipients or classes of recipients to whom that data
may be disclosed’. We found that, in most cases, data controllers provided only the per-
sonal data held, and often did not provide extra information on recipients to whom
that data might have been disclosed, aside from that provided in their privacy policies.
As was also the case with privacy policies (above), some data controllers provided infor-
mation only on the categories of recipients of personal data, and did not enumerate
specific recipients.27 This indicates that while access requests seem to be useful transpar-
ency mechanisms, investigation of supply chains is hindered where data controllers fail to
respond in full to requests (which may put them in breach of their compliance obligations
under GDPR).
That said, informed users, civil society groups and academic researchers may still find
the right of access useful for investigating supply chains. Prior work has shown that infor-
mation about a company’s technological infrastructure (e.g. database schema, software
being used, etc.) could be derived from subject access requests (Singh and Cobbe
2019). While the right of access might not provide complete visibility over the entire
supply chain of third-party services, it may provide insights into some technological com-
ponents that are in use. As such, this approach may assist in building an overall picture of
the consolidation landscape.
Table 3. The 12 websites for which we investigated their terms of service and privacy policies.
Website Type Selection Criteria
variety.com Entertainment Magazine Large number of third-party requests
thesun.co.uk News
timesonline.co.uk News
google.com Search High Alexa Ranking
facebook.com Social Media
baidu.com Search
bbc.co.uk News & Entertainment UK-based and High Alexa Ranking
ladbible.com Entertainment
gov.uk Government
nih.gov Government High Alexa Ranking (Health)
webmd.com Health
mayoclinic.org Health
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5.1.3. Limitations
Although privacy policies and the right of access appear to be obvious routes to getting a
better idea of the infrastructural supply chains of applications who are acting as data control-
lers, our research shows that theymay in practice provide only limited benefit. An initial issue
stems from the fact that, by virtue of these being data protection obligations, data controllers
are only obliged to provide information about flows of personal data. Infrastructure services
that do not process personal data would lie outside of the reach of these mechanisms.
Where personal data is involved, the utility of these transparency mechanisms is
restricted by the fact that they rely on individual obligations – that is to say, information
is to be provided only to data subjects where their personal data is being processed by a
data controller. Data controllers are only obliged to tell data subjects about the recipients
of any personal data relating to them specifically, rather than about their supply chains
more generally. If the personal data of other individuals is processed in a different way
(e.g. perhaps through different use of the application in question), then the supply
chain for that processing will itself be different.
Moreover, these obligations only extend to informing data subjects about categories of
recipient, rather than naming specific organisations, which in practice, can be vague and of
limited utility. If data subjects are provided with information on the categories of recipient
with which personal data is being shared (and only those that receive personal data), this
would not be enough information to determine which infrastructure services in particular
are involved. These mechanisms do not therefore establish a mechanism by which a more
systematic investigation into the infrastructure supply chains of online applications may
be undertaken.
5.2. Data controllers and processors
While privacy policies and the right of access are of only limited practical utility in many
cases, GDPR does provide for some other requirements for the relationship between
data controllers and processors that may be of more use in revealing the consolidation
of service supply chains. As these controller/processor relationships (as well as pro-
cessor/sub-processor relationships), as defined by GDPR, exist throughout service supply
chains, these requirements may provide a way to investigate multiple levels of an appli-
cation’s underpinning system-of-systems.
Specifically, GDPR establishes that data controllers (in this context, primarily application
developers and providers) may only lawfully use data processors (in this context, primarily
infrastructure services) who provide sufficient guarantees that their processing will be
undertaken in accordance with GDPR.28 Additionally, GDPR requires that both data con-
trollers and processors take technical and organisational measures to ensure the security
of any personal data for which they are responsible.29 And GDPR also establishes that data
processors are not themselves permitted to contract with another data processor (as a
sub-processor) to undertake processing on their behalf without written authorisation
from the controller30 – for instance, in this context, infrastructure providers would not
be able to rely on the services of another infrastructure provider without written author-
isation from the application developer in question.
In order to allow data controllers to ensure compliance with these provisions, GDPR
contains several transparency mechanisms. Primarily, this involves requiring that data
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controllers establish certain contractual obligations with data processors, which includes
obliging them to comply with various obligations.31 For example, processors have to
provide to the controller any information necessary to demonstrate compliance and to
facilitate auditing and inspections of their activities by the controller.32
The result of this is that if application developers establish those contractual obligations
with processors, as required by GDPR, then this may provide a route towards gaining
greater knowledge of the nature of the infrastructure services on which they are
relying. That is, a supply chain could be exposed by ‘following’ the contractual chain. For
example, where a data processor has no need to contract with further processors in
order to provide particular functionality, this may indicate that the processor in question
provides that functionality in-house, which, depending on the functionality in question,
may be less likely with less consolidated supply chains.
However, the information provided by infrastructure providers to application develo-
pers by way of contracts may, in many cases, be only of limited use, even to application
developers in understanding their supply chains. For instance, providing more general
information on which categories of sub-processor are being used by the processor,
would likely not in itself reveal the full complexity or consolidation of supply chains.
Additionally, the obligations described here may not enable one to ‘see’ beyond one or
two layers (i.e. only with those with which there is a direct contractual relationship),
leaving application developers with little knowledge of what is occurring further
downstream.
5.3. The role of data protection regulators
GDPR also contains powers for data protection regulators to require certain information
from data controllers.33 This includes a wide-ranging power to obtain any information
from data controllers that is necessary for the performance of the regulator’s tasks34,
and also includes the power to audit controllers.35 While data protection regulators
would therefore appear to be best placed to investigate the consolidation of service
supply chains, given their auditing powers, this is not their function, and such investi-
gations would typically be beyond their remit.
Further, the information available to data protection regulators would likely not be avail-
able to entities other than the supervisory authority itself, despite the fact that those other
entities may themselves have an interest—not only corporate competitors, but perhaps as
part of a public, journalistic or academic function—in havingmore information about infra-
structure supply chains. Nor would it be available to other regulators or oversight bodies
who would benefit from greater information about infrastructure supply chains.
Considering the above, it is clear that while GDPR does establish some requirements
that may be of some use, its benefit in providing visibility over supply chains is limited.
As discussed previously, the transparency mechanisms for data subjects are limited in
practical utility. And the mechanisms available for application developers (as data control-
lers) and data protection regulators to assess the consolidation of infrastructure services
and supply chains are not necessarily mechanisms by which a holistic view of service
supply chains can be obtained. Nor are they mechanisms that may be of use to interested
parties other than those entities, including regulators, who may have a particular interest
in getting a better understanding of supply chain consolidation.
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Moreover, as noted previously, the transparency mechanisms provided for by GDPR—
whether in relation to data subjects or to data controllers and processors— only exist
where the data being processed in the supply chain is personal data. Where data is not
personal, these mechanisms will not be available. GDPR itself is therefore not sufficient
to provide for full transparency over service supply chains, as would be necessary to inves-
tigate their consolidation.
6. Interventions for increased transparency
As the previous sections show, there are many aspects in which a lack of transparency and
a lack of disclosure can effectively obfuscate the nature of any consolidation within online
service supply chains. This lack of transparency around infrastructure services poses a
problem for understanding and overseeing the service supply chains of online appli-
cations. Without greater visibility over the actors involved within these complex supply
chains (and the nature of these data flows), the true nature of any consolidation is
masked, as are the related implications.
We therefore argue that those interested in the policy implications of online consolidation
should consider measures and interventions for increasing the transparency of the underlying
infrastructure on which many applications depend. This is to provide more information,
visibility and a better understanding of the complexity, resilience, and corporate power
issues previously discussed, thereby allowing for more meaningful policy responses.
6.1. Legal and regulatory interventions
There is much scope for legal and regulatory intervention, given (i) the current lack of
effective mechanisms for providing transparency of infrastructural supply chains or for
the accountability of infrastructure service providers, as well as (ii) the commercial incen-
tives that favour opacity.
Legally, frameworks that provide mechanisms for individuals, organisations, and over-
sight bodies to obtain more information about the use and functioning of infrastructure
services in service supply chains would be beneficial. This would be useful for regulators,
application developers, academics, and others who are interested in better understanding
the consolidation of infrastructure services and how this may affect the development and
resilience of the Internet in future. Moreover, such information can be useful for users in
general, to give some indication as to where their data flows, how their data is being used,
and to indicate any other influences on the applications that they rely upon.
Establishing proactive transparency requirements or reporting mechanisms around the
use of infrastructure services warrants consideration. While, as discussed above, GDPR
does provide for some transparency obligations, they are insufficient for allowing a sys-
tematic investigation into supply chain consolidation and complexity. A relatively straight-
forward legal change that would bring immediate and significant benefits is to remove the
words ‘or categories of recipients’ from GDPR Articles 13 and 14 (relating to privacy pol-
icies) and Article 20 (relating to the right of access). This would force a more explicit
naming of the organisations a data controller deals with. Though these are still primarily
mechanisms aimed at assisting individuals (data subjects), expanding and sharpening
reporting obligations would go some way towards providing for the kind of transparency
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needed to undertake a more systematic investigation than privacy policies and the right of
access could permit. Moreover, additional obligations on infrastructure suppliers to
provide relevant information to application developers or regulators represent a direct
approach for bringing about greater transparency.
Accountability mechanisms for service infrastructure suppliers would also be beneficial,
although it is not clear at present what shape these would take. There are reviews into the
responsibilities of online platforms underway in several jurisdictions (Department for
Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 2019; European Union 2019), but these typically concern
user-facing issues and the shape of the regulatory regimes that may emerge from these
reviews is generally uncertain at the time of writing. While, as discussed, some existing
legal frameworks apply specifically to infrastructure providers (such as the Networks
and Information Services Directive (European Union 2016a)), these are generally outside
of the scope of potential reforms. Revision of those frameworks to include transparency
obligations that would provide a greater understanding of supply chains would be a
welcome development. However, effective application of existing legal mechanisms
might be useful to some extent; e.g. where an infrastructure provider is abusing a domi-
nant position, this would be a matter for competition regulators.
6.2. Commercial incentives
Compounding the lack of legal mechanisms compelling supply-chain transparency, com-
mercial considerations and imperatives may incentivize the withholding of information
about supply chains and the use of infrastructure services. This might be due to intellectual
property and trade secrets concerns, or to maintain an advantage in terms of functionality,
price or reputation.
Conversely, however, commercial considerations and imperatives may also provide
application developers with an incentive for knowing more about the infrastructural
supply chains on which their application relies. Without knowledge of those supply
chains, the risks with regard to an infrastructure service becomes harder to assess andmiti-
gate. This could potentially lead to failures of service or downtime, resulting in loss of cus-
tomers and revenue.
Moreover, businesses are increasingly aware that they need to take data protection and
security concerns seriously. Not only is there greater publicity around data breaches and
other security issues, but, as discussed above, GDPR places obligations on data controllers
and data processors in relation to transparency and the security of personal data. In par-
ticular, GDPR places the ultimate responsibility for compliance with its requirements on
data controllers (in this context, typically the application operators), and provides them
with mechanisms by which they can obtain greater information about data processors
(i.e. here, typically infrastructure services) that are acting on their behalf. This may result
in corporations taking a greater interest in infrastructure services, potentially wanting to
know more about who is in their supply chains and what their security practices are like.
Further, aside from operational concerns, there may also be reputational implications
for organisations by virtue of the involvement of downstream providers; e.g. if certain
data flows to an organisation in a particular jurisdiction, or if an organisation perceived
by some as ‘untrustworthy’ is somehow involved. Knowledge of the nature of supply
chains can assist organisations in mitigating their exposure to such risks.
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6.3. Technology-oriented interventions
From a technical point of view, we have observed that it is generally difficult for an appli-
cation operator to see and understand what happens beyond the infrastructure with
which they directly manage and interact. For example, the data flows beyond these rela-
tively narrow boundaries are often unknown.
There is some work by the technical research communities towards increasing levels of
accountability within complex systems (Singh et al. 2018). One example, for instance, are
provenance methods—which involve the recording and analysis of the lineage and flow of
data surrounding context (i.e. metadata about data and system interactions)—which show
promise in providing greater visibility within complex systems and over systems supply
chains. However, despite the potential, much work is required and many research oppor-
tunities in the space remain (Singh, Cobbe, and Norval 2019).
In line with this, there is a clear opportunity for legal, policy and regulatory interventions
to provide incentives, on top of any commercial considerations, for the development of
technical means to improve the transparency of supply chains. Regulation that influences
technology development represents one approach, and has precedent, an example being
GDPR’s requirements for ‘data protection by design/default’.36 Policymakers can also lever-
age their ability to provide socio-economic and regulatory guidance and shaping around
the design, deployment, and use of technical systems. This includes setting or encoura-
ging standards development, or recommendations around the development of technical
systems to establish ‘best practice’. Again, considering GDPR, we have seen guidance on
technical design provided by the data protection regulators of various EU member states.
Further, to encourage new approaches, funding should also be directed towards research
(academic or otherwise) that seeks to develop a better understanding of service supply
chains and to develop technical means for transparency and accountability in those
supply chains.
7. Concluding remarks
Modern society relies heavily on online applications. These applications are often built on
top of the infrastructure services provided by others, with applications relying on a supply
chain of interconnected services operating as a system-of-systems. The consolidation and
complexity of those service supply chains raises several significant policy issues, particu-
larly regarding the resilience of online applications on which many people rely, and in
relation to the power of dominant information technology firms.
The general lack of transparency over service supply chains makes investigating these
issues difficult, whether for academic researchers, regulators or policymakers. Moreover,
this opacity poses a serious challenge for application developers and infrastructure provi-
ders, who may struggle to (i) identify the source of problems with their systems; (ii) take
measures to respond to those issues and repair or restore functionality; and more gener-
ally (iii) have a clearer understanding of the influences impacting their applications and
business. Without a better understanding of the underpinnings of online systems, the
challenges of consolidation cannot be adequately addressed.
However, existing mechanisms for transparency are limited in utility. As discussed,
there are few technical means for obtaining detailed and reliable information about
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service supply chains. Mechanisms under data protection law are also insufficient for the
reasons discussed.
From a policy perspective, to address these limitations and facilitate greater transpar-
ency over service supply chains, we argue that various interventions are necessary.
Legally, establishing mechanisms for users, application providers, regulators and policy-
makers, to obtain more information about supply chains would be of significant benefit,
as would establishing accountability mechanisms to put a check on the power of infra-
structure providers. Technically, there is much scope to encourage responsible and appro-
priate technology design, use, standards and further research.
In all, the consolidation and complexity of service supply chains warrants more atten-
tion. While the technical and legal mechanisms for addressing the resulting problems are
limited in effect, there are options available for lawmakers, regulators, policymakers and
engineers to take concrete steps that could go a significant way towards providing
more effective mechanisms for transparency. Such steps could help to improve the under-
standing of consolidation in service supply chains and its consequences.
Notes
1. There has been some consideration regarding issues of consolidation in the communications
and networking space (Labovitz et al. 2010; Internet Society 2019). The focus of this paper,
however, is the technical layers of abstraction above this, focusing on the range of online
support services (at the application layer), which operate at run-time (see §2).
2. Our analysis included both HTTP & HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) (Google
2019a). For simplicity, we will refer to these communications as HTTP, as is consistent
within the literature.
3. Domain names are identifiers for a website, such as google.com or facebook.net. A third-party
domain is one which is external to that of the website being directly accessed. As an example,
one might watch an embedded YouTube video on the BBC website. In this case, though the
user is visiting the BBC website, interactions would also occur directly between youtube.com
(the third-party) and the user’s browser.
4. Small ‘addons’ that typically provide some functionality in addition to that of the web browser.
5. https://www.alexa.com/topsites.
6. https://moz.com/top500.
7. https://majestic.com/reports/majestic-million.
8. Our script uses Selenium and ChromeDriver to create a new instance of the Chrome browser,
visit one of the websites, wait 30 s for the page to load, and then return information about the
HTTP requests made during that time (an approach similar to that taken by Libert (2015)).
9. We found that 39 (3.3%) of the sites failed to load, which is consistent with other similar ana-
lyses, e.g. Libert (2015) observed a 4 per cent failure rate.
10. A header is part of the broader networking protocol, providing information to support
communication.
11. Note that this process is not easily automated given the uniqueness of each site and need to
explore different pages, subdomains, usage patterns, etc (see §4.4).
12. Not least because header information is recommended to be obfuscated or removed for
security purposes (Hunt 2012).
13. WHOIS records are publicly available and provide information on the owner of a particular
domain, including names and contact details. However, they are not always a reliable
source of information (Liu et al. 2015; Watters et al. 2013), as WHOIS anonymization services
can be used to mask the identity of a website owner for privacy reasons. Further, WHOIS
records are thought to face further uncertainty as a result of data protection laws, given
that they involve personal data (Kulesza 2018).
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14. GDPR art.4(2).
15. GDPR art.4(1).
16. Personal data includes potentially any data from which an individual can be identified,
whether directly or indirectly, and whether from that data alone or when combined with
other data (GDPR art.4(1), recital 26).
17. GDPR art.4(8).
18. GDPR art.28.
19. GDPR art.4(7).
20. GDPR arts.13-14.
21. GDPR art.15.
22. Note the goal was to gain some ‘on the ground’ insights into the GDPR in a consolidation
context. Though a small sample size, our aim was not to conduct an exhaustive or conclusive
analysis into the nature of GDPR transparency mechanisms in practice, but rather to indicate
the potential of such for consolidation concerns.
23. https://www.alexa.com/topsites.
24. https://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Health.
25. Termed ‘special category’ data – see GDPR art.9.
26. GDPR art.15(1).
27. Though it is worth noting that if data subjects are provided with the names of each recipient
organization then this may lead to an information overload where they are confronted with
long lists of recipients without further information as to what they do. Such a list would not
likely be of much use unless the data subject recognizes the names of some recipients or is
prepared to go through each company in order to attempt to determine what kind of
service they might provide.
28. GDPR art.28.
29. GDPR art.32.
30. GDPR art.29(2).
31. See GDPR art.28(3).
32. GDPR art.28(3)(h).
33. GDPR art.58.
34. GDPR art.58(1)(a).
35. GDPR art.58(1)(b).
36. GDPR art.25.
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